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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2469th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 31 August 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2469)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

The meeting was called to order at 11.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In conformity with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2462nd, 2463rd, 2465th and 2467th meetings*], I invite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Benin, Egypt, Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, the Niger, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Cameroon to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Karom Ahmed (Chad) and Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table; Mr. Soglo (Benin), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Essy (Ivory Coast), Mr. Okeyo (Kenya), Mr. Kofa (Liberia), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Sylla (Senegal), Mr. Madar (Somalia), Mr. Elfaki (Sudan) and Mr. Towo Atangana (United Republic of Cameroon) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of the Congo in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gayama (Congo) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/15928, containing a letter dated 11 August from the representative of Chad to the President of the Council; S/15935, containing a letter dated 18 August from the representative of the Sudan to the President of the Council; and S/15936, containing a letter dated 19 August from the representative of the Congo to the Secretary-General.

4. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): I understand that this meeting has been called at the instance of the Government of Chad, and I do not wonder at that, since four weeks have passed since it made its application to the Council at the beginning of August [*2462nd meeting*]. I had not expected to find the United Kingdom the first speaker on such an occasion. However, since there seems a certain reluctance on the part of others I am very willing to begin this important debate—if that is the right word. I myself do not find an occasion today for polemics, for great argument, which is the normal meaning of debate; I find today an occasion for the statement of some fundamental principles, with special reference to the situation before us, which has been brought to us by the Government of Chad.

5. As I say, four weeks have passed. In that time, the dimensions of the conflict have become more serious, and there have been further casualties. Prolonged efforts have been made by members of the Council to secure agreement on a resolution to initiate some form of Council action. My delegation much regrets that these efforts have not so far succeeded. I should today like to record the United Kingdom's view that the Council should not let this matter drop. In so doing I wish to underline some of the principles which are at stake.

6. I do not need to restate the United Kingdom's attitude to the recent invasion of northern Chad and to the conflict which continues in that country. Our strong views on the inadmissibility of external intervention and the use of force are well known to members of the Council. But I consider that, as members of the Council with responsibilities which transcend national interests, we should reflect on the role which the Council has played on two separate occasions this year with regard to the grave problems facing one of the world's poorest and weakest countries. It would be dangerous to neglect the implications, not only for the parties to this dispute, but for Africa as a whole and, indeed, for the credibility of the Council.

7. In March [*S/15643*] the Government of Chad requested the Council's assistance in resolving a dispute with Libya which affected Chad's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The dispute was of very long standing. Previous efforts to find a solution—through bilateral negotiations, through the recognized regional organization and through the Council itself—had not succeeded. The Government of Chad was justified in turning to us again. It is precisely for such circumstances that the Security Council exists.

8. In response to Chad's appeal the Council acted cautiously and deliberately. Some felt that the Council should have adopted a more definitive stance—that it should, for example, have considered ways by which the dispute could be referred to the International Court of Justice. They had a point, but I think the Council was right at that stage to adopt a course which both parties accepted and which commanded the support of all members of the Council. In the presidential statement of 6 April, [*S/15688*] which was accepted with statesmanship and restraint by the Government of Chad, we called on Chad and Libya to settle their differences without undue delay and by peaceful means; we urged both sides to refrain from any actions which could aggravate the situation; and we appealed to them to make the fullest use of the mechanisms available within the regional organization, including the Good Offices Committee established by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

9. We must now face up frankly to the fact that the Council's appeal in April has not been heeded. We are rightly much concerned with our own effectiveness as a Council. We have spent time and effort this year in a serious review of the general principles which govern our work. Here we face a specific example. What has happened since April? Sadly, but not surprisingly, the two parties have not achieved any form of bilateral accommodation. Equally sadly, our hopes that a solution could be achieved through the OAU have not so far been realized. And most reprehensibly our appeal for a peaceful settlement and our call on both sides to refrain from any actions which could aggravate the current situation have been defied by one of the parties.

10. We face a situation, as many previous speakers have pointed out, in which in recent weeks there has been a clear and indisputable external armed intervention against the Government of the Republic of Chad. Every member of the Council is aware of this. Predictably it has been denied by the party concerned, though I hope that this indicates that a prudent line of retreat is being maintained. We will all be encouraged to hear that further steps are being taken by the OAU. But this does not absolve the Council of the need to build on the modest foundations which we carefully laid down in April. We cannot honestly consider that we have discharged our responsibilities while this conflict continues and while we ourselves have initiated no specific steps to bring about a solution.

11. The conflict is of itself of the utmost seriousness. It threatens the lives and livelihood of a nation—an African nation. The principles at stake are of fundamental importance. If we do not stand up for them, the consequences for such disputes and for our standing as a Council are grave.

12. I have in mind the principle enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations that "All Members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State" and the principles and provisions in Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 33, for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Our attempt in April to head off the threat or use of force failed. Now force has been used.

13. I also have in mind the principles of territorial integrity and its consequence, the inviolability of national boundaries. We have been reminded by many speakers whose countries are members of the OAU that this is a principle which is particularly cherished by the countries of Africa. To deal with the legacy of colonial boundaries and the risk of innumerable conflicts, the OAU decided by its resolution AHG/Res.16 (I), adopted at the first session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Cairo in 1964, to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. The United Kingdom attaches cardinal importance to the principle that frontiers should not be changed by force. It will not help the cause of peace throughout the continent of Africa if we condone the erosion of this principle. There is a risk here of opening a Pandora's box of troubles.

14. Another principle which is directly in question is that of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. No one would deny the existence of internal problems within Chad. But it is essential that the people and the Government of Chad should be left to deal with these problems as they themselves decide, with such outside assistance as they themselves may request. Assistance from the OAU led to the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*]. If the present external intervention against that Government was terminated, the people of Chad could once again embark on the course of national reconciliation and the urgent task of reconstruction. Here again is a principle on which the OAU has expressed, rightly, strong views. Is there not a risk that, if they are flouted in one case, they may be flouted in others?

15. The inherent right of Chad to self-defence against armed attack has implicitly been called in question by

certain speakers. Facing external intervention and possessing only a tiny force of its own, the Government of Chad has exercised its right to seek the help of friendly States in defending the security of its country. To equate such a request—and the response to it of members of the Council—with external intervention is a grotesque distortion of the facts, as the representative of the Niger graphically demonstrated in his statement to us on 12 August [*2465th meeting*]. As I said in my earlier intervention in this debate [*ibid.*], if we cannot use words honestly, if we cannot face the facts squarely, we cannot fulfil our duties as members of the Council.

16. Those of us who sit in the Council have been made aware of an attempt by one of the parties to turn a border dispute into something close to an ideological dispute. There has been an attempt to drum up support from a articular group of ideologically oriented countries irrespective of their connection with the matter. Is it wise of this party to drag this internal African matter into the context of East-West rivalry?

17. In conclusion, I must record my Government's regret that the Council has not so far insisted on the withdrawal of the armed forces intervening against Chad, and an end to attempts to destabilize that country by military means; and has not condemned the use of force and the military occupation of the territory of a neighbouring country. We naturally welcome the steps which are being taken to find a settlement by the Chairman of the OAU, and we wish him every success. But we believe that members of the Council should continue to keep the conflict under active review. We should keep in close contact with the parties. We should, each of us, try to form an objective assessment of developments on the ground. Moreover, all of us should continuously bear in mind the fundamental principles which are involved in this dispute. Irrespective of the attitude of individual Governments towards the details of this dispute, these principles need to be nourished and supported. To do so is surely in the interests of Africa as a whole, of the world in general and, certainly, of the standing of the Council. All of us members of the Council, collectively and individually, have an interest in this. Indeed, we have a responsibility to the world community.

18. Accordingly, we must act effectively to support these principles. My Government would have been glad to support a draft resolution which did so. We must also apply the principles to the case before us. Again my Government would have been glad to do this. As things stand, all of us must continue to search for ways in which the Council might directly promote a peaceful solution. To this end, we should be prepared to resume this debate at any time.

19. We must not allow the conflict between Libya and Chad to be added to the list of disputes which the Security Council observes in handwringing impotence and about which it does little or nothing.

20. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): Almost a month has elapsed since the President of Chad informed the Council of the serious deterioration of the situation in his country [*S/15907*]. At the Council's meeting of 16 August [*2467th meeting*] I had occasion to state my Government's position on events in Chad. The armed intervention against the Government of Chad has since continued and is likely to aggravate further the conflict in that country.

21. In view of this situation it is in our opinion high time that the present debate resulted in appropriate action by the Council. We should be neglecting our special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security if we failed to take action in this case. It is therefore a matter of concern to my Government that the Council has so far been unable to undertake any such action.

22. It has become clear from our debate that the international community holds divergent views on the situation in Chad. Nevertheless we should be able to reach a common understanding and to act accordingly on the basis of certain elements to which all parties concerned should be able to subscribe.

23. First, during the debate all speakers have expressed their deep concern at the serious aggravation of the military situation in Chad, and nobody has disputed that the conflict between Chad and Libya should be solved through negotiations and not by force.

24. Secondly, we have noted that quite a few delegations support the idea that the OAU should reintensify its efforts with a view to securing a peaceful settlement. The Netherlands, for its part, on 16 August stated that negotiations could be renewed within the context of the OAU in conformity with the resolution[1] adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU at the nineteenth session of the Assembly, held at Addis Ababa in June, inviting Chad and Libya to seek a negotiated solution to their differences within the context of the *Ad Hoc* Mediation Committee established by the OAU [*ibid., para. 15*].

25. Thirdly, it would seem that a great majority of members of the Council should be able to agree that the least the Council could do is to request the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures in order actively to follow the situation in Chad and keep the Council informed about the developments in that country.

26. Although we could also imagine more decisive action by the Council, which in our opinion would be fully justified in view of the clear violations of the Charter of the United Nations that have taken place in Chad, my Government would be prepared to support a draft resolution of the Security Council containing the abovementioned elements, to which all parties to the conflict should be able to subscribe. In our view this is the minimum the Council could and should do under the present circumstances. We are therefore sorry to note that the Council has so far been unable to act in accordance with its duties and responsibilities under the Charter. Are we really to conclude that, faced with an instance of armed intervention in a State Member of the United Nations, the Council cannot even express its concern at the grave situa-

tion in that country, cannot even encourage a relevant regional organization to undertake mediation efforts or even instruct the Secretary-General to monitor the situation closely?

27. We still hope that those who have so far shown themselves to be reluctant to support such a minimal, non-partisan and moderate stance of the Security Council will change their minds. The conflict on the ground in Chad continues, and the Council cannot and should not remain silent. The Council must therefore remain seized of this question, and the Netherlands, for its part, will continue its efforts to contribute to a peaceful solution of the grave situation in Chad.

28. Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana): This is the second time in the course of this year that the Council has, at Chad's initiative, been seized of the question of armed intervention and outside interference in that country's internal affairs. The United Nations, in the Charter of the Organization and in the relevant resolutions and decisions of the Council and the General Assembly, has resolutely set its face against intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, and with sound reason.

29. Intervention foments internal conflict. Intervention sustains and seeks to influence the outcome of such conflict, and even of war. Not infrequently, intervention has the effect of frustrating the processes of nation-building.

30. On 6 April, after consideration of the complaint by the Government of Chad, the Council, through its President, issued a statement [*S/15688*] which called upon the parties to settle their differences without delay and by peaceful means on the basis of the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and to make the fullest use of the mechanisms within the regional organization.

31. Though at that time both parties expressed their willingness to discuss their differences and to resolve them peacefully, the fact that the Council is once again called upon to consider this question is clear evidence that the call made by the Council on that occasion and the proposals contained in the statement to which I have referred have not been implemented. My delegation sincerely regrets this non-implementation, which unfortunately has resulted in the continuation and deterioration of the situation in Chad.

32. This worsening situation is creating serious tensions and instability among North African States and in the Mediterranean region also. My delegation has also noted with concern and regret the manner in which these developments are being manipulated by powerful outside forces whose interests are unrelated to those of Chad or to Africa as a whole. This external involvement can only exacerbate the problem already existing, hinder efforts to have the Mediterranean respected as a zone of peace, security and co-operation, and pose an even greater threat to international peace and security in general.

33. The situation now is evidently a more complex one. In the course of the debate a number of major elements have been raised before the Council, among them the question of recognition and the legitimacy of Governments and intervention by foreign forces.

34. In this confused situation it is absolutely essential that the correct perspective always be maintained. The Council must resist efforts to lead it along paths which would move it further away from the solution we desire. We, the members of the Council, need to be careful always to maintain in the forefront of our consideration the interests and aspirations of the people of Chad.

35. It is the understanding of the Guyana delegation that those interests and aspirations are that the people of Chad be allowed to live free from intervention or any type of interference in their internal affairs; that they be allowed to chart their own course of national, political, economic and social development in pursuit of their right to self-determination; that they be permitted to live in peace and in good relations with all their neighbours and be given the opportunity to protect their territorial integrity and have their national territory free of all foreign troops.

36. This brings into focus certain cardinal principles to which Guyana attaches the utmost importance. We feel that in its consideration of this matter the Council must be guided by these principles if it is to achieve a lasting peace and a just settlement of the question. We speak of the principle that States are obliged to show the fullest respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States. We believe that States must likewise show the fullest respect for the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. Guyana also reiterates that States have a right to solicit help if they feel threatened with aggression or intervention or interference in their internal affairs.

37. My delegation believes that the Council, in keeping with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, must be clear and forthright in its response to the complaint by the Government of Chad. In the discharge of that responsibility, the Council has an obligation to take steps to facilitate the urgent achievement of the goals and aspirations of the Chad people.

38. My delegation believes that a helpful response by the Council could have been the establishment and prompt dispatch of a fact-finding mission to assess the situation on the ground and to make a determination as to the extent to which the relevant principles are being violated and to which the attainment of the goals and aspirations of the people of Chad is being obstructed, if at all, and by whom. That mission would thereafter make its report to the Council. We are of the view, however, that the positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of the OAU on this question must be respected.

39. My delegation believes that if we were to defer to the position of the OAU on this matter, the Council would be acting fully in accordance with Article 52, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations. This Article states very clearly, however, in paragraph 4 that it in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35. My delegation would like to place particular emphasis on the right of a State, as expressed in Article 35, to bring a dispute to the attention of the Security Council. This we do because, as members of the Council are aware, there are some regional organizations which exclude from membership States Members of the United Nations.

40. I wish to conclude by expressing the sincerest wishes of the delegation of Guyana and of the Government of Guyana for the early success of the efforts of the OAU in this matter.

41. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): And so, exactly 28 days since we heard the massively-documented complaint of the sole, legitimate Government of Chad against the flagrant aggression of Libya, fully four weeks since we listened to the appeal of Chad for urgent help in combating that aggression, the Council meets one more time—and for what reason? To affirm its fundamental irrelevance to the realities of international gangsterism and to admit its utter futility as an effective instrument of international peace and security.

42. Indeed, this is not a proud day for the United Nations Security Council. The losers in the proceedings of this past month are many. There is of course the Security Council itself, which has been cynically manipulated—and worse, which has permitted itself to be cynically manipulated. There is the Charter of the United Nations, which has been so contemptuously violated. There is that group within the Council which has been throughout an entire month of negotiation the victim of the most radical among its members. And again, what is worse is that this group has been a willing victim, and that the negotiations have been dishonest from the beginning. Every concession by the honourable and the reasonable has been frustrated by yet another non-negotiable demand by the extremists—encouraged from within the Council's permanent membership, we do not for one moment doubt, by Libya's benefactor and protector, the Soviet Union.

43. It is tempting, if only for the sake of symmetry, to balance losers with winners and thus to credit Libya with a victory for its naked, unprovoked aggression. But to draw any such conclusion from the charade of the last month in the Council—and let there be not a moment's doubt on this score either—would be a very, very great mistake. For there were some among this Council's own membership who did not wait for the Council or rely on the Council to respond to the urgent appeal of Chad. There were those who realized that aggression had to be deterred, who accepted their obligation—under the Charter, indeed—to help Chad defend itself, who were prepared to make that commitment. My Government was one of those. Zaire was another. France was a third. Our commitment to the freedom and independence of Chad is strong and tangible, and we would urge the aggressor and those who encourage aggression to pay particular heed: that commitment to the freedom and independence of Chad continues.

44. There are, we believe, other winners in this process, however fruitless its outcome to date may be. Chad surely is one. Its posture throughout has been courageous and dignified. Its spokesmen have treated the lies and the invective of Libya with the quiet contempt they deserve. Zaire also has been a winner, in its immediate, powerful response to Chad's appeal for help and—in concert with the representative of Togo—in its genuine search for consensus within the Council's non-aligned group. The fact that this effort was unavailing, that indeed it never had a chance of success in view of the prevailing cynicism and the deliberate manipulation of the Council's consultative process—well, none of this reflects discredit on either Zaire or Togo.

45. We believe there has been another clear and significant signal given in the course of the Council's consideration of Chad's complaint: the virtually unanimous voice of Chad's African neighbours in condemnation of Libyan aggression and in courageous support of the Government of Chad, the Government of President Hissein Habré. It has been an impressive display of adherence to the principles that are supposed to impel the United Nations to effective action, and of a clear-eyed realism that not to oppose aggression is quite simply to incite more, and more flagrant, aggression—graver threats to international peace and security, closer and closer to home.

46. If ever there was a documented case of unprovoked aggression, this was it. We cannot conceive of a situation in which the aggressor was more unmistakably identified. Equally, we find it impossible to imagine an appeal more meritorious than that addressed to us, on 3 August, by Chad [*2462nd meeting*].

47. By the very same token, our response should have been unequivocal and immediate. On 4 August we should have been prepared to vote on a draft resolution that condemned Libyan aggression and that demanded the cessation of fighting and the immediate withdrawal of Libyan forces from the territory of Chad—thus clearing the way for Chad to reconcile its own internal differences, and to control its own destiny as a free and independent nation, utilizing the good offices of the OAU or possibly of the United Nations itself in this effort of self-determination.

48. Would such a draft resolution have succeeded? Almost surely not. But such a draft resolution would keep faith with the mandate of the Charter and would serve one very important purpose additionally: it would identify for all the world to see those who reject the use of force as an instrument of international relations, and those who not only condone the use of force but even support and encourage it.

49. As I have said already, the absence of such a draft resolution makes this far from a proud day for the Council and the world Organization. But more than that, it is a

day of the gravest danger—and particularly for those small and relatively defenceless nations, like Chad, which are the actual or the intended or the potential victims of aggression.

50. In a very important sense, the United States does not need the United Nations—certainly not for its protection, certainly not for its defence. But for many nations around the world, particularly those which constitute the non-aligned group within the Council, an appeal to the United Nations may represent their ultimate and essential recourse. Universal adherence to the principles of the Charter may be their only guarantee against the adventurism of a Qaddafi or against global imperialism—imperfect, yes, but the best this imperfect world has yet been able to devise.

51. The inherent authority of this approximation of a world community is not, however, self-enforcing. It requires the courage of the Member States' avowed convictions and the determination to resist aggression and the willingness to stand up and be counted.

52. We must therefore pose this question: by their inability or unwillingness to act, by their readiness to be victimized and manipulated, by their contribution to the undermining of the effectiveness of the Council and of the United Nations generally, are the members of the Security Council helping to arm their own executioners? We are appalled by the answer that, so far, this proceeding appears to provide.

53. Mr. Shah NAWAZ (Pakistan): Since this is the last day of August and my first statement in a formal meeting of the Council under your presidency, Sir, I shall begin by expressing our deep appreciation of the outstanding manner in which you have guided the work of the Council. Your widely acknowledged wisdom and experience have greatly benefitted the Council, especially in its deliberations over the situation of breach of peace in strife-afflicted and war-torn Chad.

54. I should also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, who guided the work of the Council last month with great skill, wisdom and statesmanship.

55. Earlier during the debate [*ibid.*] we received with deep concern the information provided by Mr. Korom Ahmed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, and by that country's representative, about the intolerable conditions inside Chad. We listened to their complaint of Libyan military intervention in the conflict. We also took note of the statement made by the Libyan representative disclaiming such an involvement on the part of his country.

56. We have also taken note of the statements made before the Council by several other delegations, both on the complaint brought by Chad and on a separate complaint by Libya [*S/15914*] which was concurrently debated. These twin debates have, regrettably, generated an atmosphere of confrontation and hostility which has been reflected in the acerbity of some of the statements made by the protagonists. If the Council is to make any useful contribution towards resolving the issues that have been raised, it would be necessary to concentrate on the realities of the situation beyond the polemics and the verbal sparring in the debate.

57. In its more than 20 years of independent life, Chad has seen little tranquillity or peace. Internecine conflicts have throughout ravaged that country and attracted foreign intervention more than once and from more than one direction. In this tragic situation, the people of Chad are the primary victims whose aspirations for peace, for deliverance from extreme poverty and for national reconstruction continue to be a dream awaiting fulfilment.

58. When Chad brought its complaint to the Council, the internal conflict in the country and the acts of foreign intervention in its affairs had escalated to an unprecedented level. The circumstances surrounding these events may invite varying interpretations, and charges and counter-charges made in the Council's debate may evoke different reactions, but the principles which are being flouted and which need to be upheld remain sacrosanct and inviolate.

59. The external interference in Chad's affairs, in utter disregard for respect for its political independence and territorial integrity, is the central issue constituting the international dimension of the Chad crisis. It is for the people of Chad to choose their leaders and their system of government. They must be left to themselves to settle their political differences and order their affairs in peace, without outside interference or pressure. Neighbours cannot arrogate to themselves the right to pick a winner of their own choice, back him with all available resources and confer legitimacy on him. Our firm opposition to such a propensity in any part of the world requires no reiteration.

60. At the same time, we are concerned over outside Powers aligning themselves in this internal conflict. Their involvement will worsen the situation, compound difficulties and prolong the tragedy of the people of Chad. This issue, if drawn into the vortex of East-West confrontation, would become insoluble.

61. Since I have touched upon the Libyan complaint which relates to the situation in the North African region, I feel obliged to offer a few observations to set out our views. It is quite clear that the factors that lie at the heart of the current crises in the region, of which Libya is a part, are varied and complex.

62. We are conscious of the implications of the Libyan complaint and the spectre of destabilization which it evokes. It is our earnest hope that such fears will prove to be unfounded and that all the countries of the region, including Libya, can continue to live in peace and security and have the uninterrupted opportunity of devoting their energies to the paramount task of national reconstruction.

63. At the same time, we cannot but deplore the existence or creation of circumstances in which a small country feels threatened or experiences violations of its sovereignty and, unable to defend itself with its own resources, feels compelled to resort to measures which could further limit its sovereignty and independence, even though its right to do so is unquestionable.

64. The transcendent interests of the great Powers which often lead to the projection of their power in countries and regions far beyond their frontiers is a fact of international life which cannot be wished away by a mere reiteration of principles of non-intervention and non-interference. The smaller nations can construct a barrier against intervention, first of all, by setting their own affairs in order and by conducting their relations with each other in conformity with the principles which they profess. It is the strife within and conflicts among the smaller nations themselves and the failure on the part of larger countries to respect the sovereignty and independence of small neighbours which all too frequently attract foreign intervention.

65. Such is our perception of the situation in Chad and North Africa and the interplay of regional and extraregional factors in it. Regrettably, the Council, despite its strenuous efforts, has not come up with a decision which could fully respond to the conditions of intervention and conflict in Chad on the basis of principles and at the same time enjoy the support of all members of the Council.

66. In our view a proper response from the Council should have the following elements: first, affirmation of respect for the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Chad and observance of the principles of non-use of force, non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States; secondly, the termination of all foreign intervention, the withdrawal of foreign forces and a call on the parties involved in the conflict to disengage so as to allow the process of peace to gather momentum; and thirdly, encouragement and support for efforts by the OAU to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem afflicting Chad.

67. When Chad brought its complaint to the Council about a month ago, the facts of the situation on the ground were much disputed and each protagonist had drawn a picture of the situation that reflected its own strongly-held view and conflicted with that of the others. The Council could not simply select one set of facts as the basis for its approach to the problem, nor could it find a way of escape by partially or wholly relying on media reports on the situation. That in our view was the time for the Council to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Chad under the auspices of the Secretary-General with a mandate to submit a report to the Council within a specified period. That was also the time when we would have wished to see the Council take a decision combining the three elements I have just mentioned as its integral measures. Such a step would have enabled the Council to play an effective role in the resolution of the problem.

68. Regrettably that moment has passed. The unconscionably long and arid debate in and outside the Council occupied a portion of time during which the convulsions that shook Chad settled with recognizable contours. In the new situation, the Council should for the time being confine its role to encouraging the OAU, which has already taken certain important initiatives, to carry these forward to their logical conclusion.

69. As we look at the background of the crisis in Chad, we feel increasingly convinced that the African States themselves have provided practical, just and credible answers to the Chad problem in the past. It is unfortunate that the agreement worked out by them four years ago at Lagos [*S/14378, annex I*], which was blessed by the OAU, was not given a chance to be fully implemented. At this stage, what is important is not to apportion blame but to revert without delay to the course which has been lost.

70. Earlier this year also, when Chad brought a complaint to the Council in regard to the Aouzou Strip [*S/15643*], the President of the Council, in a statement issued on behalf of its members on 6 April [*S/15688*], appealed to the two countries to make full use of the mechanism available within the OAU. It may be recalled that in June last the OAU decided to activate its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Libya-Chad dispute under the chairmanship of Gabon.

71. We repose our hopes, once again, in the efforts of the OAU and in its ability to bring relief to the grave situation in Chad, and we feel heartened by the prompt initiative of the Chairman of the OAU which is already under way. At the same time, we fully realize that since April the situation in Chad has become aggravated far beyond the description of a mere bilateral dispute between Libya and Chad or a civil strife between the two contenders of power. It has assumed an international dimension of great complexity with serious implications for the peace and security of the entire region. In the circumstances the Council must remain seized of the situation, which continues to pose a threat to regional and international peace and security.

72. Should the efforts of the OAU fail to bear fruit, the Council should resume its consideration of the situation and take appropriate measures in the discharge of its Charter responsibilities.

73. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Today, here in the Council before it began its meeting, I asked a representative what we could really expect at this meeting and he answered me that, as was perfectly understandable and natural, judging from some of the speakers inscribed to speak, we would hear expressions of disappointment, disillusionment and even despair.

74. Indeed, one precisely limited group of States came forth with an entire series of statements expressing feelings of disappointment and despair, and there is a simple reason for this. They have not been able to draw the Council into activities inappropriate for it.

75. Their activities resulted, as was inevitable, in failure. Their efforts failed because they have tried in the Council to defend and advance an unjust and mistaken cause. They have been trying, from outside and with the assistance of the Council, to dictate their conditions to an entire continent, without giving the Africans themselves the right to settle their own affairs.

76. The policy pursued in the Council by that group of States constitutes an act of open defiance of the OAU.

77. I shall be specific. First, although the OAU has repeatedly expressed its advocacy of an immediate cessation of the armed hostilities and bloodshed in Chad, that group of States has not heeded the appeal of the OAU, because it was not to its liking. Secondly, the OAU has vigorously expressed its position that outside intervention—both African and non-African—in Chad's affairs should cease. Yet in none of the statements made by the aforementioned group of States has anything been said about non-interference. That group of States evidently feels it is right to intervene from outside in Africa's internal affairs. Thirdly, the OAU has advocated national reconciliation of the various factions and groups in Chad. But that group of States is evidently in favour of war—a war of extermination in Chad, war until Chad's last citizen is exterminated. Fourthly, the OAU has officially requested, through the President of the Council, that the Council not take any action, so as to make it possible for the OAU to continue its efforts. Yet that group of States is rejecting that request by the OAU as well.

78. Thus, two separate policies have clearly emerged from the Council's consideration of this item: one is "Africa for the Africans"—letting the OAU settle this difficult problem itself. That policy is supported by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union will continue to support it. The other policy is "Africa as a sphere of influence"—a policy upheld by those who would like to continue to resolve Africa's affairs by themselves, those who would like to return Africa to the sad times of the Berlin Congress. But such a policy is the echo of a remote past: it has also been rejected by most of the members of the Council. Therefore this policy which has been pursued by one narrow group of States in the Council was obviously doomed to failure and, accordingly, has failed.

79. Finally, I wish to refer to the pathetic words uttered here today by one representative, to the effect that the Security Council has been unable to do anything in this matter for 28 days now. But it is precisely his delegation which, not for just some days but for many years, has been blocking action by the Council against the Israeli aggressors. It is precisely that delegation which, not just for several days but for many years, has been blocking action in the Council against the South African racists. Therefore, the aforementioned lamentations are nothing more than crocodile tears.

80. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Congo. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

81. Mr. GAYAMA (Congo) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, the States Members of the United Nations and in particular the members of the Council are already familiar with your vast diplomatic experience. That is why most of the preceding speakers have very rightly extended their congratulations to you for the effective way in which you have so far been conducting the Council's work. My delegation cannot fail to join in the sentiments expressed by those speakers.

82. No one is better qualified than you, Sir, the representative of France, to direct the debate on this question of Chad, given the role that your country is now playing and that it has always played in matters regarding Chad, both prior to and since that country's independence. My delegation would mention in particular the role your country has played in affording Chad and its people the opportunity to achieve reconciliation and to establish a just and lasting peace in that country.

83. With the new outbreak of war in Chad over the past two months, the fraternal people of that country, which has suffered so severely in recent years, has been living through an atrocious tragedy not of its own making, in the words used by my country's President, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, in his address to his African colleagues and other guests at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Congolese revolution to describe the disturbing situation prevailing in that friendly country.

84. On that occasion, moved by the sincere desire and fraternal concern to contribute, in no matter how small a way, to alleviating the heavy burden on the fraternal people of Chad, the heads of State of central Africa and the current Chairman of the OAU conducted, in a responsible and constructive way, a "broad exchange of views on the situation that has prevailed in Chad over the past few years".

85. With the permission of members of the Council, I should like to highlight the declaration that resulted from that exchange of views, as it is contained in the annex to document S/15936 which we have addressed to the Secretary-General. The Declaration of Brazzaville on the situation in Chad, as the document is entitled, was prompted mainly by the deep concern aroused by the extreme gravity of the problem and of the obvious risks of its becoming internationalized. It will therefore come as no surprise that the heads of State clearly indicated that the solution to this conflict is not military, but political.

86. Some action was therefore deemed necessary, and, as was most fitting, the current Chairman of the OAU was requested to establish contact with all the parties concerned with a view to achieving, first, a cease-fire; secondly, the withdrawal of all foreign troops; and, thirdly, a commitment on the part of all countries to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Chad.

87. For the accuracy of the verbatim record, we should also mention two points: first, that one of the countries that participated in the meeting, Zaire, was unable to take a position on the results set forth in the Declaration;

secondly, that several other delegations represented in Brazzaville at other than the head-of-State level followed those discussions closely and expressed their interest.

88. In order properly to assess the intrinsic value of the Declaration of Brazzaville, my delegation would like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the fact that it is, above all, the result of the first attempt at diplomatic action voluntarily undertaken by a group of political leaders at the highest level aimed at demonstrating the presence and watchfulness of Africa with regard to a problem that our continent, today more than ever before, has the right and the duty to solve.

89. The surest way of doing so is by peaceful means, one of the essential bases for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the view of the Congo, the problem cannot be solved by a resort to violence. That can only turn the land of Chad into a charnel-house, which would be of benefit only to foreign countries at the expense of the people of Chad.

90. We need only note the great solicitude being lavished today on Chad by the weapons merchants. It is somewhat suspect, however, considering that none of those countries showed the slightest generosity when it was a matter of Chad's economic and social development. This helps us to understand the true motives behind the take-over being attempted in Chad and, beyond that country, in all of Africa.

91. My delegation would, in all modesty, invite members of the Council to take this as food for thought and to look upon the Declaration of Brazzaville as the modest proposal of a group of countries bound together by their friendship for Chad, one put forward as an alternative to war, which would wreak incalculable devastation on the life of a people and a nation.

92. Convinced of the need for peaceful coexistence, harmony and understanding among States or groups of States, whatever their philosophy or their political, economic or social system, the People's Republic of the Congo advocate mutual respect, non-intervention and anti-imperialism. In addition, our familiarity with the people of Chad and their problems is not merely theoretical; it is a tangible reality of which we have had daily experience thanks to our many historic and human ties. Hence the People's Republic of the Congo has always felt honoured to be the bearer of peace and harmony with regard to Chad, as well as to other neighbouring countries of central Africa.

93. This constant practice of the policy of good-neighbourliness, the constant concern of President Sassou-Nguesso and of the Government of the Congo, cannot be related to any passing interest or temporary factor. For that reason, my country has always attempted to preserve its ability to act as a conciliator rather than to lend its support to interventionist manoeuvres which, in the end, alienate the independence of Africa and play into the hands of the worst enemies of its freedom.

94. My country therefore hopes, above all, for a final settlement of the problem of Chad through the reconciliation of all Chadians, free from foreign interference.

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite him to make his statement.

96. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to begin my statement by drawing the Council's attention to certain facts and clarifying matters.

97. Some members of the Council are still insisting on distorting the actual situation prevailing in Chad. Those members have tried to use the Council as a means of propaganda against Libya. And here I refer to statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States.

98. In order that facts not be misrepresented, my country's delegation stresses once again that there is in Chad a civil war, the consequence of a long history of colonialism inflicted on the African continent, the vestiges of which influence many African countries.

99. This civil war in Chad has ideological, religious, tribal and ethnic roots and is being encouraged by the imperialist countries. What made this situation worse is the mutiny of one of the eleven Chad contingents, meaning the Army of the North under Hissein Habré, which is being supported and protected by French, Zairian and American forces, as well as mercenaries.

100. We are convinced that the attempts to convert the internal strife in Chad into a conflict between Libya and Chad are not but desperate attempts to use this Council as a forum for propaganda against the Jamahiriya. Such attempts are led by the United States, whose Administration is the enemy of the Libyan people in particular, and of the African and Arab peoples in general.

101. The United States and France have tried to gain legitimacy for their stooge, Hissein Habré, in Chad in order to protect their interests. That is unacceptable to my country, and, I believe, to the majority of members of the Council.

102. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stresses its firm position that stems from the fact that the presence of imperialist forces in an African country represents a direct threat to Libya and its neighbours. It would be preferable for the Council to call upon those forces to withdraw and allow the people of Chad to solve their problems by themselves or through initiatives of the OAU.

103. The representative of the United States uttered many misrepresentations with regard to Libya. I merely wish to say that at this time his Administration is exerting a show of force in various parts of the world and threatening peoples of Latin America, South-East Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

104. In drawing the Council's attention to his point of view, he forgot to mention that the United States itself has exercised its right of veto more than 30 times against the interests of peoples. Recently it was the only country that supported the illegitimacy, expansion and use of force in the acquisition of territory, as well as the massacring of the Palestinian people, when it exercised its right of veto against a draft resolution on that matter.

105. It is not surprising that the leaders of outmoded imperialism should hasten to launch an attack against a country wishing to be free from all kinds of pressure. It is not surprising that they should hasten to install their own stooges—something that was mentioned by the representative of the United States. Currently they are trying to protect their stooge, Habré, against the will of the people of Chad.

106. The United States and other imperialist countries care nothing about the interests of Chad or those of the other peoples of Africa, let alone those of the Palestinian and Arab peoples. The President of the United States said that Chad comes within the sphere of influence of France. That means that the world is divided into spheres of influence.

107. The representative of the American Administration was telling the truth when he mentioned that his country did not need the United Nations. Indeed the American Administration, along with Zionist organizations, is trying to put an end to the Organization, thus getting rid of any control over flexing its muscles and using all its capabilities to put the world in the grip of American monopolies.

108. Some representatives referred to principles and said that they should be upheld. But we believe that a multifaceted policy exists. We have never heard the protagonists of colonialism make any such references when the Council discussed intervention, threats and hostile acts on the part of the American Administration against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or Nicaragua. We would have hoped that those concerned with peace and with principles would have been able to refer to the flexing of muscles and the threat and use of force against an Arab people trying to live in peace and to practise a policy of non-alignment and frankly express their opinions against the American Administration's unjust and unethical policy against the African peoples, the Palestinian people, the Arab peoples and the peoples of Central America.

109. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya seeks peace and prosperity for the people of Chad, for the situation in Chad must have consequences for neighbouring countries. Any aggravation of the situation in Chad, or in any part of the neighbouring countries, particularly Libya, would directly or indirectly affect their security, because what is taking place must affect them. We therefore hope that the people of Chad will be able to realize national conciliation and to set up a Government, or to encourage or preserve the Transitional Government of National Unity established through the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*], and not through the use of force, and blessed by the OAU. It enjoys the support of the majority of the people of Chad. We hope that our brothers in Chad will be able to preserve their country and to remove the French and Zairian troops from their country. The Jamahiriya is ready to co-operate with its sister African nations and with their disputing Chadian brothers if they so wish. It is ready to contribute to any initiatives, just as it has in the past, in order to put an end to the civil war and to bring about national reconciliation.

110. The Jamahiriya supports the initiatives undertaken by the OAU and believes that the proper solution is to leave the whole matter to that Organization, whose Chairman has undertaken consultations on the matter. Several statements have been released, all calling for an end to the tragedy in Chad and national reconciliation.

111. The Jamahiriya rejects the use of the situation in Chad by the United States and other imperialist countries as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of the Jamahiriya or other neighbouring countries in preparation for campaigns against the Libyan people.

112. In conclusion, I believe that the proper solution will be to implement the Lagos Accord and to uphold the national Government, supporting it and leaving the Chadian people to make its own decisions.

113. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As President of the Council I would draw attention to the statement just made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. He has once again trampled on the authority of the Council. We are meeting here to hear a complaint by the legitimate Government of Chad, a Government whose legitimacy has been recognized by the Council in the statement of 6 April last, which I need not recall [*S/15688*]. It has also been recognized by the majority of members of the OAU and by the OAU itself.

114. The next speaker is Mr. Korom Ahmed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, upon whom I call.

115. Mr. KOROM AHMED (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): I shall not stoop to the level of Qaddafi's representative to respond to his madness. I prefer to maintain the proper level of this discussion and to address the question that is of such importance to Chad.

116. It is with great bitterness and profound disappointment that I once again, on behalf of my delegation, address this august assemblage.

117. First of all, I wish to extend our most heartfelt thanks and gratitude to all the members of the Council and all the representatives of the friendly countries, Members of the Organization, that have spoken in the debate on the question before the Council in total support of the just cause of Chad.

118. The text that has been proposed for adoption, a purely procedural text, in our view constitutes the very least that we could have expected of the Council. It will be

recalled that throughout the discussion of the question before the Council our delegation has presented most striking evidence of Libya's outright aggression against Chad and its martyred people. It will also be recalled that throughout the course of this debate, which is a very painful one for our delegation, we have brought before the Council the facts of the situation, irrefutable proof of this brutal aggression, and have denounced the actions of the new imperialism now surfacing in Africa. We have given evidence of the annexationism and interventionism of Colonel Qaddafi's Libya, which threaten the peace, stability and security not only of a small, peaceful country such as Chad but of most of the countries of the region as well.

119. In order to attain its objectives and carry out its sordid and diabolical plans, Colonel Qaddafi's Libya, with the blessing, assistance and encouragement of a permanent member of the Council, the Soviet Union, established a military arsenal of unusual size in order to occupy by force today the northern half of our country, as in the past it occupied Aouzou, in defiance of the principles of international law and of all the principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations. Libya is once again using the most sophisticated weapons against a country that has more need of bread than of gunpowder. I repeat that those weapons are principally Soviet. Colonel Qaddafi is deploying against innocent, unarmed, civilian populations his horde, the Islamic Legion. Sufficient evidence of this barbaric policy has been brought to the Council.

120. It is in this context that the Chad delegation, wishing to preserve both the spirit and the principles of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, to which Chad and Libya belong, submitted a draft resolution on the problem concerning it to the group of eight countries of the Movement. In order to make it possible for that group to arrive at a consensus text demonstrating the solidarity and unity of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the delegation of Chad made enormous concessions. In spite of the willingness of our delegation, and in the face of the lack of political will on the part of Libya, ever-present in the non-aligned group, the group was, unfortunately, again to our great disappointment, unable to arrive at a compromise text in accordance with the relevant principles of our movement.

121. Frankly, we were not expecting these disappointing results, in so far as small countries, of which Chad is one, have always had great faith in the principles of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations.

122. We believe that a country that suffers aggression, as is the case of Chad, is entitled to come before the Council, whose essential task is the maintenance of peace and security in the world. All the members of the Council, and in particular the non-aligned, have a very important role to play in this field, since this is a conflict between two members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

123. There can be no doubt that this is a serious evasion of responsibility by the non-aligned members of the Council. It is a dangerous and grave precedent for the future not only of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, whose principles and ideals the group is by definition entrusted with defending within the United Nations, but also of the Council, whose principal mission, we recall, is the maintenance of international peace and security.

124. Certain States members of the Council, and in particular those that belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, would like this serious issue to be referred purely and simply, without any further action, to the OAU. We agree with such action in principle, but that group was acting as spokesman of the Libyan aggressor. We recall that the dispute between Chad and Libya was submitted by Chad to the OAU at the fourteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Libreville in 1977. But, as always, Libya, which seems to lay down the law within the OAU, has since then virtually blocked the functioning of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Chad-Libya dispute, established at that meeting.[2] That is why, in the face of the occupation of part of our territory and the worsening of Libyan aggression, Chad asked the Council to compel Colonel Qaddafi's Libya to listen to reason by the adoption of a suitable text.

125. The draft resolution submitted by our delegation to the non-aligned group and the purely procedural text presented by the President of the Council clearly stressed the important role which should be played by the OAU in the search for a peaceful solution to this painful problem. It is therefore difficult to understand how a certain number of members of the Council insist on the need to refer the question purely and simply to the OAU, thus meeting the demand of Libya, an aggressor country which the Council should logically condemn unhesitatingly.

126. Should we therefore take it that force can prevail over law, that might always makes right? How otherwise are we to explain the fact that Chad, a small, poor country with no other means of exerting pressure than the strength of its just cause, has not prevailed over a rich and arrogant Libya, whose brutal aggression has been so clearly demonstrated? Or are we faced with a manifestation of the demands of a small group of developing countries which would consider the non-aligned countries to be the supposed natural allies of the Soviet Union, and which from the outset placed this war of aggression waged by Libya against my country in the context of the East-West conflict? If this is so, may I remind the Council that we have a new era before us, one fraught with hitherto unknown dangers. May I also remind the non-aligned countries that the Foreign Ministers and heads of Delegation of non-aligned countries participating in the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, at their meeting held in New York from 4 to 9 October 1982, issued an appeal to all the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries not to interfere in Chad's internal affairs [*S/15454, annex, para. 33*].

127. At this very moment, as I address this body, Qaddafi's Libya continues to strengthen its military appa-

ratus, with dozens of Soviet combat planes and Soviet equipment based on Chad territory and with more than 6,000 Libyans in the north of the country. The situation is extremely serious. Hence, in spite of the fact that the Council is momentarily paralysed, we continue to believe in its responsibility for taking the appropriate measures to restore peace to Chad and thus to the region. Therefore, for our delegation the debate remains open and Chad reserves its right to return to the Council at any time.

128. In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like to express to you and to the chairman of the non-aligned group, the representative of Togo, our most sincere thanks for the very commendable, intensive efforts that you have both made to arrive at a compromise text taking account of the serious situation prevailing in Chad. Unfortunately, all those efforts have not been crowned with success. None the less, we believe that they have contributed to clarifying the positions of all in the face of this painful problem facing my country. We believe that this precedent will serve as a lesson for all small countries that suffer the risk of aggression in the future by powerful, arrogant countries such as Libya.

129. In conclusion, I should like to make a brief comment in response to the statement just made by the representative of the Congo. The Declaration adopted at Brazzaville spoke of non-interference by the neighbours of Chad. I am surprised that the representative of the Congo did not mention that paragraph in his statement and I hope a correction will therefore be made to the statement he has just made, so that the Council may take note of it.

130. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to speak as the representative of FRANCE.

131. I shall not return to the substance of the debate, that is, the situation that led the Government of Chad to bring a complaint against the Libyan invasion before the Council. The Chad situation is now known to all, and the position of France, which I set forth in my statement on 12 August [*2465th meeting*], was lucidly developed *in extenso* by the President of the French Republic on 26 August.

132. I should merely like to recall, at this stage of our debate and taking into account the consultations I have had in recent days, the position of my country with regard to the respective roles of the OAU and the United Nations.

133. France attaches great importance to the role of regional organizations. In particular, it gives constant support to the OAU, which it sees as an irreplaceable framework for the settlement of African conflicts. This is particularly true of the conflict in Chad, with respect to which the French Government resolutely supports the efforts of the OAU. Moreover, an OAU mission is in Paris today where it is being received by the highest authorities. Thus, bearing in mind the initiative being prepared by the regional Organization, we agree in this case that the Council, without in any way evading its responsibilities in this matter, should not take a position today.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

NOTES

[1] A/38/312, annex, resolution AHG/Res.106 (XIX).

[2] A/32/310, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.108 (XIV).

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